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UTAH 
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
FIRST SECURITY BANK OF UTAH, 
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, a 
National Banking Association, 
Appellant, 
vs. 
ORVILLE L. CREECH, RUBY E. 
CREECH, LARRY O. CREECH, 
JOANN CREECH and WALTER 
HERBERT CREECH 
Appellees. 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Case No. 910149 
Comes now Appellant above-named, by and through counsel, 
and herewith petitions the Court for rehearing under the provisions 
of Rule 35 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. The points of 
law or fact which petitioner claims the Court has overlooked or 
misapprehended are as follows: 
I. NEITHER THE PARTIES NOR THE TRIAL COURT CONCLUDED THAT THE 
"[BANKRUPTCY] STIPULATION AND 'RESULTING ORDER' [WERE] VOID." 
The trial court characterized the "Bankruptcy Order[s] [as] 
ineffective . . . ." prospectively, and at no time ruled that they 
were void. Memorandum Decision March 29, 1990, p. 4. As suggested 
by Mr. Dougherty's quote cited in the dissenting opinion, the parties 
neither suggested nor should this Court have determined that the 
fact of a bankruptcy proceeding and events that occurred thereunder 
did not occur. 
Further, one of the major thrusts of First Security's 
position on appeal related to the gross inequity that occurs when 
one party to a transaction is relieved of liability thereunder while 
the other party is given no "offsetting" relief. 
Thus, the Court's ruling that the trial court declared the 
bankruptcy stipulation and resulting order void and that the parties 
acquiesced in that ruling not only is incorrect, but has a tendency 
to mischaracterize First Security's overall position in connection 
with the appeal. 
II. FIRST SECURITY1S POINTS ON APPEAL DO NOT INCLUDE AN ASSERTION 
THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING ON THE PARTIES1 RIGHTS 
AND DUTIES UNDER THE LOAN AGREEMENTS. 
First Security's points on appeal do not include an 
assertion that the trial court erred in ruling on the parties' rights 
and duties under the Loan Agreements, although that suggestion is 
implicit in First Security's points on appeal, all of which comply 
with the provisions of Rule 24(a)(9) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. 
III. THE CREECH BANKRUPTCY WAS NOT DISMISSED UNDER 11 U.S.C. § 349. 
On page seven of the Court's opinion, the Court made it 
abundantly clear that, notwithstanding the comments of counsel during 
oral argument, the Creech bankruptcy was "dismissed under Section 349 
• • • • 
11 U.S.C. §349 is not an operative section of the Bankruptcy 
Code. The Creech bankruptcy was dismissed under the provisions of 
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11 U.S.C. §1208(c)(6) because of a "material default by the debtor[s] 
with respect to a term of a confirmed plan". The bankruptcy case was 
dismissed because of the Creeches* 
failure to comply with the terms of their confirmed plan and, in 
turn, the operative provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. 
IV, 11 U.S.C. § 349 WAS MISAPPLIED BY THE COURT. 
As articulated by Attorney Dougherty during oral argument, 
cases decided under Section 349 deal with property rights, transfers 
and the like primarily involving third parties. 
Nowhere in Section 349 can language be found suggesting that 
the fact of the occurrence of the bankruptcy can be ignored or that 
it has no force and effect. 
As suggested in First Security's brief on appeal, if Section 
349 has any applicability to this case, it should be for the benefit 
of First Security — it is First Security that substantially changed 
its position and incurred significant expense as a result of and in 
connection with the debtors* bankruptcy proceeding, while the elder 
Creeches have lost none of their rights to obtain relief under the 
Bankruptcy Code. 
V. THE DEBTORS' RIGHT TO PURSUE RELIEF UNDER THE PROVISIONS 
OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE ARE SPECIFICALLY PRESERVED UNDER 
11 U.S.C. § 349(a). 
The operation and enforceability of an ipso facto clause 
outside the context of a bankruptcy proceeding in no way impairs the 
rights of the debtors to obtain whatever relief is available to them 
under the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code where, as here, their 
case was dismissed without prejudice. Thus, even if, as the Court 
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suggests, the Creeches had some sort of valuable property right in 
their agreements with First Security at the time their bankruptcy 
case was dismissed, those property rights could become assets of the 
debtors1 estates in a subsequent bankruptcy filing. Also, the same 
agreements in which the Court suggests reside valuable property 
rights contain the agreement of the debtors that failure to make 
payments and/or filing bankruptcy are events of default, 
VI. THE PROPERTY OF THE DEBTORS WAS ALREADY REVESTED IN THE 
DEBTORS BEFORE THE BANKRUPTCY WAS DISMISSED — NOT BY 
OPERATION OF 11 U.S.C. § 349. 
Whether the provisions of the confirmed plan had any 
efficacy in the State Court proceeding is irrelevant to the 
applicability of 11 U.S.C. § 1227(b) which, as the Court acknowledges 
in its opinion, provides for vesting of all property of the estate 
in the debtors unless otherwise provided for in the plan. In the 
Creech bankruptcy, the plan did not provide otherwise. Thus, at the 
time of the dismissal, all of the property of the estate, including 
the debtors* rights under their contracts with First Security were 
vested in the debtors. 
The debtors were, and remain, in a position to assert 
against First Security in the State Court litigation whatever rights 
they might have under their contracts with First Security. 
11 U.S.C. § 349 does not have the effect of giving the 
debtors greater rights under their contract with First Security than 
they already had. The debtors agreed in those very contracts that 
failure to make payments and/or the commencement of an insolvency 
proceeding were events of default. 
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VII. THE DEBTORS1 FAILURE TO MAKE PAYMENTS TO PLAINTIFF AS AGREED 
DURING THE BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDINGS CONSTITUTE AN EVENT OF 
DEFAULT UNDER THE 1986 LOAN DOCUMENTS. 
The effect of the Majority Opinion is to grant the elder 
Creeches a payment holiday during the pendency of their bankruptcy 
proceedings, even though they missed several payments during the 
course of their bankruptcy. The implication of the Majority Opinion 
is that the Bankruptcy Code's prohibition against the enforcement of 
ipso facto clauses under certain circumstances excuses defaults based 
upon post-petition failure to make payments. However, the express 
language of the Bankruptcy Code's treatment of ipso facto clauses 
applies only to the filing of bankruptcy for the purpose of 
preserving such things as executory contracts, and does not excuse 
the consequences of post-filing default. While it is true that the 
automatic stay operates to protect a debtor from collection actions 
based upon post-petition defaults so long as the automatic stay is 
still in effect, the Bankruptcy Code does not operate to excuse a 
debtor from the consequences of such defaults. 
By arguing that the ipso facto clause treatment excused them 
from making post-petition payments, the elder Creeches are improperly 
attempting to use bankruptcy as both a shield and a sword. They 
claim that because of the dismissal of the case, all orders entered 
during the course of the bankruptcy are no longer binding upon them, 
yet they still claim the benefits of being in bankruptcy by claiming 
that their status as debtors excused them from making any payments 
during the course of the bankruptcy. 
However, several bankruptcy courts have recognized defaults 
under loan documents for failure of bankruptcy debtors to make 
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post-petition payments, even when the debtors were not in default 
prior to bankruptcy. In Matter of LHP Realty Corp., 726 F.2d 327 
(7th Cir. 1984), the Seventh Circuit approved debt acceleration 
based upon post-petition defaults of payment. 
Similarly, in In re Skvler Ridae, 80 B.R. 500 (Bankr. CD. 
Cal. 1987), an oversecured lender was awarded its default rate of 
interest under Bankruptcy Code Section 506(b) based upon the debtor's 
post-petition defaults in payments. In In re Manville Forest Products 
Corp., 43 B.R. 293 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984), the bankruptcy court 
recognized two types of defaults by the bankrupt debtor: the filing 
of a bankruptcy petition and failure to make payments post-petition. 
It is manifestly unjust to excuse the elder Creeches from 
the consequences of the automatic acceleration of the 1986 loan 
documents and their failure to make post-petition payments under the 
1986 loan documents merely because their bankruptcy case was 
dismissed, when absent dismissal they would have been required to 
cure all of their post-petition defaults in order to deaccelerate 
the automatic acceleration of their debts (in effect, perform the 
terms of their confirmed plan of reorganization). The injustice is 
aggravated where the bankruptcy case was dismissed because of the 
elder Creeches' failure to comply with the terms of their plan, 
thereby entitling them to better treatment than the treatment they 
would have been entitled to if they had complied with the require-
ments of the Bankruptcy Code. The Majority Opinion encourages 
borrowers to deliberately breach obligations entered into in the 
context of bankruptcy proceedings in order to achieve better 
treatment if their cases are dismissed for failure to comply with 
their plans. 
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VIII. THE CASES CITED BY FIRST SECURITY IN SUPPORT OF THE VALIDITY 
OF IPSO FACTO CLAUSES WERE MISINTERPRETED BY THE COURT AND THE 
COMMENCEMENT OF BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDINGS BY DEFENDANTS ORVILLE 
AND RUBY CREECH CONSTITUTED AN EVENT OF DEFAULT UNDER THE 
1986 LOAN DOCUMENTATION. 
The Court suggests in the same portion of its opinion where 
it determines that the Creeches* bankruptcy was dismissed under 
Section 349, that the cases cited by First Security did not support 
First Security's position, when, in fact, the cases provided sound 
bases for First Security's position. 
Virtually all of the events that occurred in the cases cited 
by First Security which support the operation of ipso facto clauses 
have occurred in the Creech case (e.g. relief from stay, functional 
equivalent of abandonment), and then some — the Creech case was also 
dismissed. Thus, the courts in the cases cited by First Security 
approved the effectiveness of ipso facto clauses under circumstances 
where the bankruptcy was still pending. 
The effect of First Security's relief from the provisions 
of the automatic stay, commencement of its State Court foreclosure 
action, and the decisions of Judges Clark and Sam relative to the 
propriety of the State Court action took not only the "hard" assets 
of the debtors, but also any claims and/or liabilities of the debtors 
(except for deficiency judgment) outside the ambit of the bankruptcy 
proceedings. 
It is illogical to suggest that the subsequent dismissal of 
the bankruptcy somehow improved the position of the Creeches through 
an interpretation of 11 U.S.C. § 349 which had little, if anything, 
to do with the position of the Creeches on appeal. 
The Court's Majority Opinion acknowledges that First 
Security cited in its Principal Brief "a number of decisions in 
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possession instead if, by the exercise of its contractual 
or other rights, it held a possessory interest pri or to 
the filing of bankruptcy. 
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the acceleration of the principal amount of all claims against the 
debtor.1 Thus, debts which would otherwise be unmatured become 
matured upon the filing of the bankruptcy petition." In re Kroh 
Brothers Development Co., 101 B.R. 114, 117 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1989). 
See also, In re Tonvan Construction Co., Inc., 28 B.R. 714, 727 
(Bankr. N.D. 111. 1983); In re Princess Baking Corp., 5 B.R. 587, 
590 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1980). 
The conclusion is inescapable that the elder Creeches are in 
default to First Security, regardless of whether the elder Creeches 
are deemed to be in default because the filing of their bankruptcy 
case automatically accelerated First Security's 1986 loan documenta-
tion or the dismissal of their bankruptcy resulted in the enforce-
ability of the ipso facto clause in the 1986 loan documentation. 
IX. THE COURT'S ASSUMPTIONS RELATIVE TO FIRST SECURITY'S DECISIONS 
AND REALIZATIONS ARE IMPROPER AND HAVE NO BASIS IN THE RECORD. 
The Court suggests in footnote 2 that First Security 
apparently made some sort of determination to "abandon . . . reliance 
on the stipulation ..." and "should have realized [the effect of 
section 349]" when the Bankruptcy Court dismissed the Creeches' 
bankruptcy. The basis of the Court's assumptions is the very opinion 
in which the Court makes the assumption, since there is no authority 
that any of the parties were aware of suggesting that 11 U.S.C. § 349 
had the effect decided by the Court where the stay had been lifted, 
all of the property of the estate had been vested in the debtors and 
the issues joined in the State Court. First Security's motion for 
partial summary judgment before the State Court did not have the 
effect of "abandoning" anything; and its position in this Court was 
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that if, arguendo, the trial court gave the Creeches relief; First 
Security was entitled to similar relief under Section 349. 
The Court in its decision suggests that First Security could 
have obtained, among other things, relief from the automatic stay 
provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 362. That, of course, had already been 
accomplished, and the Bankruptcy Court had no further interest in 
the assets which were the subject matter of the State Court litiga-
tion. The suggestion of the Court that First Security had some sort 
of option to seek the lift of the automatic stay and foreclose on 
the collateral begs the question since First Security had already 
obtained relief from the stay and was foreclosing on the collateral. 
X. 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(1)(B) DOES NOT RENDER IPSO FACTO CLAUSES 
INEFFECTIVE. 
On page six of its opinion, the Court said, "This provision 
[Section 541(c)(1)(B)] rendered the ipso facto clauses in the loan 
agreements ineffective." Section 541(c)(1)(B) does nothing of the 
kind! That section simply provides that an ipso facto clause cannot 
prevent property of the debtors from becoming property of the estate. 
In the Creech bankruptcy, the property did become property of the 
estate, the property was revested in the debtors, First Security 
obtained relief from the automatic stay, and was in the process of 
pursuing its foreclosure action under the terms of its agreements in 
the State Court when the bankruptcy was dismissed as a result of the 
defalcation of the Creeches. 
Whether there was a clause in the agreements between the 
Creeches and First Security which would prevent the Creeches* assets 
from becoming assets of the estate isn't even an issue in this case, 
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let alone whether 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(1)(B) "rendered the ipso facto 
clauses in the loan agreements effective." 
XI. THE COURT'S REFERENCE TO THE BANKRUPTCY COURT1S DECISION 
DISMISSING THE CREECH BANKRUPTCY IS MISPLACED AND TAKEN OUT 
OF CONTEXT. 
In footnote 2 of its opinion, the Court quotes a portion of 
Judge Clark's decision dismissing the Creech bankruptcy in support of 
its suggestion that, somehow, First Security should have anticipated 
the decisions of Judge Low and this Court and failed to protect 
itself. 
As can be seen from Judge Clark's opinion, the elder 
Creeches were fighting tooth and nail to remain in bankruptcy; and, 
presumably, subject to the stipulations and orders in the context of 
the bankruptcy that they now conveniently repudiate. In the 
bankruptcy dismissal hearing, Mr. Dougherty argued to Judge Clark 
that a dismissal would not be in the best interest of creditors and 
Judge Clark rejected that argument. Thus, Judge Clark's comments 
quoted by the Court in footnote 2 go not to the issue of whether 
some heretofore unknown remedy existed for First Security, but to 
respond to the elder Creeches' final argument. In re Creech, No. 
86C-05249, unpubl. slip op. at 7-8 (Bankr. D. Utah Nov. 13, 1989). 
Counsel for petitioner herewith certifies that this petition 
is presented in good faith and not for delay. 
DATED this 13 day of Apx4r3r-r^ l993. 
JNEY & NEBEKER 
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